

The President's Daily Brief

June 16, 1975

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TURKEY

The Turkish national security council will meet today to consider retaliation against the US for the arms embargo.

Prime Minister Demirel said at a press conference yesterday that Turkey cannot be expected to carry out bilateral agreements that have been unilaterally abrogated by the US. He called on NATO to "heal the wounds" caused by the arms embargo and hinted that if the West European allies are unwilling to help fill Turkey's armaments gap, Ankara might consider reducing or ending its participation in the alliance.


Demirel reportedly has become convinced that the US Congress will not lift the embargo. He may see the threat of firm action as Turkey's only means of bringing pressure on the US to change its policy. To make the threat more credible, Demirel may be willing to take the first steps toward reducing the US presence.

To take any such action, however, Demirel will need the agreement of Turkish military leaders. They have so far demonstrated considerable reluctance to take any irreversible steps. Turkish generals, most of whom believe Ankara has no alternative to its alliance with the US and Western Europe, are likely to argue in today's council session for a very gradual approach. This might begin with a request to the US that it begin preparations to withdraw from those facilities

that benefit Turkey least.

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ISRAEL-LEBANON

Israeli	aircraft and a	rtillery at-	
tacked fedaye	en concentrati	ons near Mount	5
Hermon in sou	itheastern Leba	non yesterday	
in retaliation	on for a guerri	lla raid on	
the Israeli 1	order village	of Kefar Yuval	٤.

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The Israeli action is the first inside Lebanon since forces from the two countries clashed three weeks ago. The strikes followed the penetration of an Israeli border village by four Arab guerrillas who seized six Israeli hostages. All four guerrillas were subsequently killed; at least two Israelis died, and six were wounded.

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NOTE	25X1
West German	25X1

USSR

Analysis of four selected technological areas-transport aircraft, semiconductors, digital computers, and air traffic control systems-indicates that the Soviet Union will eventually profit militarily by acquiring advanced Western technology. It is impossible to say with confidence, however, to what degree and at what rate this will occur because of the multiple sources of the technology and because of uncertainty regarding the ability and intent of the USSR to adapt the technology for military purposes.

The cumulative effect of increased technology transfers from the West will result in some selective improvements in the Soviet strategic military posture over the next five to ten years. Appreciably greater improvement would occur if the rate and scope of such transfers were to increase sharply.

Channels for the transfer of technology to the USSR have expanded greatly since 1972.

The Soviets, given the continuation of detente and relaxation of controls by the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls, will acquire Western technology of most interest to them in piecemeal fashion, but at an increasing rate

nology will flow to the USSR directly and through other countries, including advanced Western states outside of the Coordinating Committee as well as through Eastern Europe. Such countries will also sell to the USSR technology they have developed by themselves, straining the Coordinating Committee's structure and resulting in added pressure on the US government to relax its unilateral controls.

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A major obstacle to the Soviets' achievement of military gains through the use of civilian Western technology appears to be the Soviets' difficulty assimilating and adapting such technology for extensive military production. They can overcome this obstacle only to the extent they can get hold of advanced technology for production of systems and components. Such technology may be considered obsolete by Western standards, but could be used by the Soviets to improve considerably their military production capabilities.

Transport Aircraft

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	25)
Soviet nego-	25 X
tiations on wide-body aircraft have	25)
explored many possibilities for transfer of technol-	
ogy, including production licenses and aircraft pur-	
chases. Information acquired by the Soviets since	
1972 probably has been insufficient to use in rede-	
signing Soviet production lines.	

Close study of design and fabrication practices evident from purchased aircraft would probably have only limited value because of shortcomings in Soviet manufacturing capabilities. A licensing agreement, whether for aircraft or engines, would permit the export of necessary data and give the Soviets an opportunity to become self-sufficient in production of such Western designs.

Semiconductors

Soviet integrated circuit production technology, particularly with respect to quality control and contamination protection, lags behind

Access to Western production technology, sought extensively by the Soviets since 1970, would be of great benefit to the Soviet military within a relatively short time. It could possibly be used in strategic missiles, anti-submarine warfare detection systems, cryptography, and computer equipment. Barring substantial relaxations in the embargo of this technology, Soviet development of an advanced semiconductor industry will remain slow.

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Digital Computers

Soviet general-purpose computer technology is generally behind that of Western countries, although a limited number of the more advanced models probably are available for military use. Substantial progress in some important military uses of computers, such as command and control and possibly anti-ballistic missile defense, will require		25X1
computer technology beyond the USSR's likely capabilities in the near future. the Soviets will probably acquire from various sources the know-how and equipment that will make their own general-purpose computers suitable for full-time military uses. Soviet acquisition of production technology for minicomputers,		25X1 25X1
microprocessors, and associated equipment over the next decade or so is a serious potential threat in terms of what it could do toward improving the Soviet strategic posture.		25X1 25X1
Air Traffic Control Systems		
		25X1
Probably the greatest potential mili-		
tary benefit would result from the use of such equipment to demonstrate the organizational and op-		
erational techniques of automated command and control systems and to permit extensive training in the actual operation of such systems.	25X1	

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